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Abstract 
The main lesson learned from the recent financial crisis is the crucial role of interconnectedness 
between banks as a factor that can push the effects of bank defaults to extreme levels. 
One bank in distress can compromise the ability to repay obligations of its creditor banks, thereby 
inducing a more general crisis that spreads from the banking system towards the real economy. Several 
empirical and theoretical studies have focused on the role of the interbank market in causing contagion 
in financial crises. 
In this regard, one frequent problem encountered in dealing with contagion risk in the banking system 
is that only data on interbank credits and debts aggregated at bank level are publicly available, whereas 
the whole matrix of interbank linkages would be needed in order to estimate systemic risk correctly. 
One common solution is to assume that banks maximise the dispersion of their interbank credits and 
debts, so that the interbank matrix can be approximated by its maximum entropy. 
This paper tests the influence of this hypothesis on simulations by verifying if variations in the 
structure of the interbank matrix lead to significant changes in the magnitude of contagion. 
In order to do this, an algorithm was developed that generates interbank matrices with higher 
concentration. Then a Monte Carlo simulation was run by making use of the SYMBOL model 
(SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses) jointly developed by the JRC, DG MARKT, and 
experts of banking regulation (see De Lisa et al., 2010). We than compared results obtained using the 
maximum entropy approximated matrix with those obtained from more concentrated matrices. 
Numerical experiments, performed on samples of banks from four European countries, highlight that 
concentration in interbank loans does affect results but that, when considering the probability 
distribution of losses, even significant changes in the interbank matrix do not deeply affect results. 
 
 
Keywords: Financial contagion, interbank lending, systemic crisis, systemic risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. They 
therefore need to be considered in any banking model aiming at estimating the probability of a 
systemic banking crisis. One of the effects of interbank connections is that one initial bank failure 
could have domino effects on the whole system: interbank markets can be a major carrier of contagion 
among banks, as problems affecting one bank may spread to others. 
Contagion results from two risks: first, the risk that at least one component of the system could default 
(probability of a bank defaulting) and, second, the risk that this shock could propagate through the 
system (potential impact of the default). As the former can stem from a variety of unexpected 
situations, and is driven mainly by assets’ riskiness and solvency, this research focuses on the latter. In 
particular, the goal of this paper is to assess how a hypothesis on the structure of the interbank market 
(i.e. the matrix of credit and debts among banks) affects the magnitude of a systemic banking crisis. 
One common problem in dealing with interbank market structures is that only partial data are 
available, as balance sheets report only aggregated interbank assets and liabilities. Maximum entropy 
approximation offers a way to proxy interbank bilateral exposures, assuming that banks maximise the 
dispersion of their interbank credits and debts. But what is the cost of such an approximation? 
This paper assesses the influence of the maximum entropy hypothesis by verifying if variations in the 
matrix structure lead to significantly different results in systemic excess losses, i.e. losses that exceed 
capital requirements. The model generates losses in the banking systems of four countries (Belgium, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal) via Monte Carlo simulations.  
This is achieved by making use of the SYMBOL model (SYstemic Model of Banking Originated 
Losses) jointly developed by the JRC, DG MARKT, and experts of banking regulation (see De Lisa et 
al. (2011)), that estimates aggregate losses, country by country, on the basis of individual banks’ asset 
default probabilities, calculated by means of the Basel FIRB (Foundation Internal Ratings Based) 
formula. 
Interbank exposures are initially modelled using a matrix that maximises the dispersion of banks’ 
bilateral exposures. Contagion results obtained from this scenario are then compared with those 
achieved with a more concentrated interbank matrix, in order to evaluate if contagion is influenced by 
hypotheses on interbank exposures. 
Results show that relaxing the hypothesis of a maximum entropy interbank matrix does affect systemic 
excess losses. This holds true in Belgium, Ireland and Portugal, whereas in Italy results are more 
stable. By contrast, probability distributions are rather robust to variations in the interbank matrix in all 
four countries. 
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Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between financial crises in which contagion plays a prominent role 
and cases in which contagion is not so relevant. When contagion effects are small, systemic excess 
losses seem to be underestimated by the maximum entropy hypothesis in countries with large 
interbank exposures. Conversely, with large contagion effects excess losses are overestimated. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on interbank market 
contagion; Section 3 explains the maximum entropy matrix approximation, the algorithm to adjust the 
interbank exposures matrix and the scenario generation procedure; Section 4 presents data used to 
perform the numerical analysis; Section 5 shows results; and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Liteterature review 
 
It is well-known that if a failing bank does not repay its obligations in the interbank market, this could 
compromise the solvency of its creditor banks and lead to a domino effect in the banking system. 
Hence, contagion occurs when the financial distress of a single bank affects one bank’s ability to pay 
debts to other financial institutions. Therefore, interlinkages between banks could eventually have an 
impact on the whole financial system and, beyond that, on the state of the entire economy. 
Moreover, the pattern of the interbank linkages could affect the way a crisis propagates through the 
system. Theoretical studies often apply network theory to the banking system and, in particular, focus 
on the completeness and connectedness of the interbank matrix. According to Allen and Gale (2000), 
three main forms of interbank network can be distinguished: (i) the ‘complete interbank structure’ 
where banks are linked to all other banks, (ii) the ‘incomplete interbank structure’ where banks are just 
linked to neighbouring banks (i.e. banks specialise in particular areas of business or have closer 
connections with banks that operate in the same geographical or political unit) and (iii) the 
‘disconnected (incomplete) market structure’ where there are different disconnected regions of banks 
(i.e. banks A and B trade with each other, but not with banks C and D that, in turn, hold deposits in 
each other). Allen and Gale (2000) argue that contagion effects are less likely to occur in a complete 
interbank structure, since the relationships with a large number of banks act as a buffer on the impact 
of a single bank in financial distress. A fourth form of interbank linkage is known as the ‘money 
centre’ (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) where banks are not linked together but only a central 
money institution is connected to each financial institution. In this case, it is possible that the failure of 
a single bank will not trigger the failure of the money centre, but if the money centre itself goes 
bankrupt this can have a domino effect on the whole interbank market. In addition, a ‘multiple money 
centre’ structure occurs when the interbank market consists of a number of banking groups, each led 
by a money centre, where interbank claims are traded solely between banks in the same group. 
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Many empirical contributions have focused on the role played by the interbank market in spreading 
financial contagion. A summary can be found in Upper (2011).  
Most of these works have no detailed information on the interbank market. To circumvent this lack of 
data, some contributions have therefore focused on a segment of the market for which bilateral 
interbank exposures were available at individual bank level. For instance, Furfine (2003) investigated a 
small fraction of US interbank exposures related to the Federal Reserve’s large-value transfer system. 
Similarly, Degryse and Nguyen (2007) investigated how the structure of the interbank market 
influences contagion risk, making use of panel data on large exposures to banks in Belgium. In this 
way, they identified, over time, the pattern of contagion risk due to interbank defaults. They performed 
a sort of stress test to evaluate how the failure of an individual bank, caused by a sudden and 
idiosyncratic shock, could cause a systemic crisis in the Belgian financial system, explaining the time-
series behaviour of contagion. They found that moving from a complete structure to a multiple-money-
centre structure (i.e. a situation dominated by higher concentration on the banking market) decreases 
both the risk and the impact of domestic contagion. 
Other contributions have covered the whole interbank market and had to make some assumptions 
about the structure of the matrix. For instance, Upper and Worms (2004) used aggregate interbank 
assets and liabilities from banks’ balance sheets to estimate the matrix of interbank relationships by 
maximising the entropy of claims. In this hypothesis, each bank lends to all the others, so that the 
market is complete in the sense of Allen and Gale (2000). Wells (2004) and van Lelyveld and Liedorp 
(2006) have actual data on large bilateral exposures and used maximum entropy techniques just to 
estimate the rest of the interbank matrix. Moreover, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) made a valuable 
contribution by comparing the results based on the maximum entropy proxy with survey data on 
exposures in the Netherlands. They showed that the approximation does not seem to introduce a bias in 
the estimate of the actual linkages between banks. 
With regard to the Italian interbank market, Mistrulli (2005 and 2010) carried out a survey to evaluate 
contagion in the banking system comparing the hypothesis of the ‘complete’ structure maximising the 
entropy of interbank linkages with the ‘multiple money centre’ structure observed in Italy. To this end, 
a single dataset including actual bilateral exposures was used. The results indicate that the maximum 
entropy approximation tends to provide a biased estimate of the extent of financial contagion. In 
particular, the estimated matrix overrates the vulnerability to contagion, but this does not hold true in 
general, depending on different elements such as the size of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates 
of interbank exposures and banks’ capitalisation. 
About shocks modelling, two main approaches are used in these papers. The first and most used 
approach relies on the artificial failure of single banks that (possibly) causes subsequent collapses in 
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the banking environment considered (e.g. van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006; Mistrulli, 2005), while the 
second is based on common shocks for the whole system (as in Elsinger, 2006).  
Based on this second approach, the study reported in this paper aims to assess how an approximation 
of interbank linkages (that can possibly be very different from the actual linkages) affects the 
evaluation of systemic risk in a financial environment. It simulates the behaviour of the banking 
system in the presence of contagion, under the maximum entropy assumption. The starting point for 
this paper is a Monte Carlo simulation as in De Lisa et al. (2011) that make it possible to obtain 
directly scenarios with multiple defaults. Banks’ assets are considered to be correlated. Therefore, in 
bad economic cycles multiple banks are exposed to potential failure. In particular, this paper estimates 
the distribution of aggregated excess losses (i.e. the losses of a bank that exceed the capital buffer) in 
the banking system, assuming that the default of one bank can trigger the default of others, which are 
linked to the failed bank via the interbank market matrix. 
In order to test the soundness of the maximum entropy assumption, this hypothesis is relaxed to see if 
variations in the structure of the interbank market lead to significantly different systemic excess losses. 
Changes in the interbank matrix aim to relax the hypothesis of complete markets (as defined in Allen 
and Gale (2000)): for each bank analysed, a certain proportion of exposures are set to zero and the 
related contagion effects are compared with those obtained in maximum entropy conditions.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Interbank matrix structure 
This analysis assesses the uncertainty in results of simulations, due to approximation of the interbank 
matrix. Available data for each bank cover only total credits and debts to other banks, but information 
on bilateral exposures between banks is not publicly available. For this reason, the interbank matrix 
must be inferred by making assumptions on how interbank debts and credits are spread over the 
system. 
Following Upper and Worms (2004), the first step is to approximate the interbank matrix with the 
maximum entropy one, i.e. assume that banks maximise the dispersion of their interbank credits and 
debts. This maximum entropy matrix is taken as the reference base in the numerical experiment 
presented in the next section. 
Considering a banking system made up of J banks, the interbank exposures can be represented as a J × 
J matrix IB = {xjk}, j,k = 1,…, J. 
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where xjk represents the exposure (debt) of bank j to bank k. 
Diagonal elements {xjj}, j = 1,…, J,  representing self-exposures, are set at zero, so the interbank 
matrix of bilateral exposures becomes: 
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Only the total amount of interbank credits and interbank debts are known, i.e. 
j
jkk xx  and 

k
jkj xx  respectively. Moreover, as the samples considered do not cover the whole system, 
typically the values for total credits and total debits differ, i.e.  
j
j
k
k xx . 
To take this into account, a row and a column must be added to the matrix, representing the net 
positions with regard to the ‘rest of the world’. The interbank matrix is extended to a (J+1)×(J+1) 
matrix such that  
j
j
k
k xx . This difference can be attributed to banks in proportion to their total 
exposure, as follows: 
If  
j
j
k
k xx the last column will contain: 
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x
x 1 , j = 1,…, J 
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Symmetrically, if  
j
j
k
k xx the last row will contain: 
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Keeping these constraints and assuming that the individual interbank exposures in the sample display 
maximum dispersion, so that each bank lends to each of the others in proportion to its share of the total 
interbank credit. All the other values can be calculated. In this way the largest lender will be the largest 
creditor for all other banks, and banks with no debts will evidently result in a column of zeros. 
The corresponding matrix is obtained numerically via the ENTROP algorithm (see Blien and Graef 
(1997)). 
In order to test the robustness of the maximum entropy assumption, variations were introduced in the 
interbank matrix to evaluate if these changes induce a significant variation in results. 
Variations in the matrix of bilateral interbank exposures obtained via the ENTROP algorithm were 
introduced with a procedure that preserves the totals but introduces one zero more at each step. In this 
way an incomplete matrix is obtained that concentrates interbank activities into a limited pre-set 
number of non-zero values. 
The procedure develops as follows:  
Considering, for example, a 5 × 5 IB matrix: 
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(1) Select, randomly, two different rows and two different columns, which identify four different 
elements of the matrix (e.g. rows 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 identify x13, x14, x23 and x24). 
Provided all four values are different from zero, these elements are going to be changed in 
order to obtain a new matrix with one additional zero.  
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(2) Evaluate which of the four elements has the lowest value (in this example this is x13 = 5). 
(3) The lowest value is subtracted from itself and also from the element in the other row and other 
column 5;05 42423131  xxxx  and added to the element in the same row but different 
column and in the same column but different row 5;5 41413232  xxxx . 
The new matrix IB’ will be: 
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In this way row and column totals are maintained, but a zero is introduced where the lowest value was 
originally placed. 
This procedure is then iterated, up to the pre-set number of zeros. 
For each country, the process starts with the maximum entropy matrix and adjusts it as described in the 
previous section in order to produce 20 series of interbank matrices with 20 %, 35 %, 50 %, 65 % and 
80 % more elements set to zero (other than the diagonal elements or elements already set at zero). To 
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perform a ‘ceteris paribus’ analysis, for each simulation the variation in the interbank matrix is set 
randomly, whereas the internal losses suffered by each bank (see next section) are always the same. In 
this way different results for the same country can only be due to variations in the interbank matrix. 
 
3.2 Generating scenarios 
In order to verify the effectiveness of contagion, the authors consider it fundamental to generate 
market scenarios as close as possible to the real market situation. To do this, a Monte Carlo simulation 
coherent with a Basel II framework and based on balance-sheet data (see De Lisa et al. (2011)) was 
performed with banks’ correlated assets. The correlation between banks’ assets is fundamental, as in 
this way market scenarios often include cases where one or a few bank defaults are rounded by some 
other cases of near-to-default banks, which are situations that are more likely to start financial 
contagion. 
 
Table 1: Number of primary defaults (before contagion) 
Number of primary defaults BE IE IT PT 
1 8 663 8 931 6 696 8 855 
2 959 806 1 493 840 
3 252 183 696 197 
4 73 51 330 69 
5 29 16 185 21 
> 5 24 13 600 18 
Total 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
 
Simulations are based on the following three steps: 
(1) Estimate, based on assets, the average assets probability to default [PD] of each bank j  
jDP
ˆ  
calculated as the PD that allows the actual value of the capital requirement for that specific 
bank Kj (extracted from balance-sheet data) to be equal to its numerically calculated value, 
setting the other variables, i.e. loss given default (LGD), maturity (M) and size (S), to their 
standard values: 
  jjj KSMLGDDPKDP  505.245.0|ˆ:ˆ  
where: 
    IiASMLGDPDCSMLGDPDK ij
j
ijijijijijijijijijj ,...,1,,,,,,   
is the sum of the capital allocation parameter (Cij) of each exposure i of bank j multiplied by its 
amount Aij . 
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(2) For each simulation n, calculate bank j’s losses njL  performing a Monte Carlo simulation based 
on: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 1
1
ˆ , 501ˆ ˆ ˆ, 0.45 0.45
ˆ ˆ1 , 50 1 , 50
ˆ1 1.5 1.06
j
nj nj j j nj j
j j
j
R PD
L z PD N N PD N z PD
R PD R PD
B PD
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
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where 
Nn ,...,1  simulations 
  njNznj ,1,0~   
  kjzz nknj  5.0,cov  
These primary banks’ simulated losses are then compared with banks’ capital. Whenever in 
each bank j 
  jjnjnj CAPDPzL ˆ,    
losses net of provisions exceed total capital and bank j is considered to default in simulation n. 
These net losses   jjnjnj CAPDPzL ˆ,  are recorded (when at least one bank defaults) as ‘no 
contagion losses’. 
This produces a wealth of synthetic market scenarios, distributed as implicitly defined by the 
Basel II Regulation, correlated between banks, and based on proxies of assets PD and actual 
values of the total capital of each bank considered. This is the starting point for testing 
contagion effects. 
(3) Following James (1991), it was assumed that, whenever a bank defaults, 40% of the amount of 
its interbank debts are passed onto creditor banks and distributed between them, so that: 
   ˆ ˆ, , ,cnj nj j nj nj j k kj
k
L z PD IB L z PD D x   where 1kD   if bank k defaulted, and zero otherwise. 
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Considering this, bank j defaults when 
 ˆ, ,cnj nj j jL z PD IB CAP . 
Contagion is looped up to the cycle where no more banks default. 
Finally, net losses  ˆ, ,cnj nj j jL z PD IB CAP  are recorded (when at least one bank defaults). 
Simulations were performed in order to have 10,000 significant values for each country considered and 
for each interbank matrix. Setting the same starting seed in a random number generator assures that 
differences in contagion results are due to the interbank matrix variation. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
Some authors point out that different features of banking systems could lead to different effects of the 
maximum entropy hypothesis. For this reason, the analysis was conducted on four banking systems: 
Belgium (BE), Italy (IT), Ireland (IE) and Portugal (PT). These banking systems show different 
distributions of banks’ concentration ratio and business models. This makes it possible to evaluate if 
the impact of changes in the hypotheses over the interbank matrix is related to countries’ specific 
characteristics. Data are based on the Bankscope dataset, as of December 2009, integrated with ECB 
and central banks’ values. 
Table 2 contains aggregate information about the data considered for each country. 
 
Table 2: Description of the samples used for simulations 
 Number of 
banks 
Sample % 
population 
Capital (m€) Total assets 
(m€) 
Interbank debts 
(m€) 
Interbank 
credits (m€) 
BE 23 82.26 % 48 401 878 336 97 493 84 727 
IE 24 101.91 % 65 392 1 221 181 276 738 148 729 
IT 473 81.81 % 270 876 2 827 051 188 375 195 958 
PT 14 66.49 % 26 341 323 762 43 561 34 504 
 
 
Capital/total 
assets 
Interbank 
debts/total 
assets 
Interbank 
credits/total 
assets 
Herfindhal 
index (over 
total assets) 
Herfindhal 
index 
(over interbank 
debts) 
Herfindhal 
index 
(over interbank 
credits) 
BE 0.055 0.111 0.096 0.293 0.304 0.256 
IE 0.054 0.227 0.122 0.154 0.177 0.214 
IT 0.096 0.067 0.069 0.054 0.092 0.117 
PT 0.081 0.135 0.107 0.259 0.228 0.345 
 
The sample of banks covered in each country (‘sample population’) is calculated with reference to the 
amount of total assets reported by the ECB1. 
                                                 
1 Source: European Central Bank (2010), EU banking structures:  http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eubankingstructure201009en.pdf. 
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Capitalisation levels, measured by the capital/total assets ratio, first approximate the extent to which 
banks are resilient to defaults of their own assets. That also depends on the riskiness of the assets, 
which is taken into account in the scenario-generating process. 
Columns containing interbank volumes represent the size of interbank debts and credits over total 
assets. Herfindhal indices monitor concentration in the banking system relative to total asset and 
interbank exposures. The index is generally calculated as: 



N
k
ksH
1
2 , 
where ks  is the market share of firm k in the market with respect to the variable considered (total 
assets, interbank debts and credits). 
Looking at the tables above, Belgium has a small number of banks and, according to its Herfindhal 
indices, a highly concentrated banking system in terms of total assets and interbank exposures. The 
Irish banking system is not highly concentrated and is made up of a small number of banks highly 
exposed in the interbank market. 
Italy has the largest number of banks, high capitalisation, low interbank exposures and low Herfindhal 
indices. Portugal has the smallest number of banks, a high capitalisation level and, together with 
Belgium, the highest level of concentration in terms of both total assets and interbank exposures. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Effects on contagion 
The consequences of assuming ‘maximum entropy’ for interbank exposures are not evident a priori. 
On the one hand, the maximum entropy assumption could lead to underestimation of contagion risk: 
the consequences of a default are actually spread across all the other banks, limiting the effects on each 
single bank. On the other, this assumption reflects the connectedness between all banks, even where no 
real interbank links exist, thus possibly creating fictitious ways of propagating contagion. For this 
reason, the influence of variations in the interbank matrix is verified for the whole probability 
distribution of estimated losses. 
As expected, concentration in the interbank matrix does affect variability. In particular, the higher the 
concentration in interbank connections (number of zeros in the interbank matrix), the higher the 
variability in results. As can also be seen, higher interbank values (Ireland) result in higher variability, 
while a higher number of banks (Italy) possibly induces more stability. 
In this regard, Table 3 reports the average ratios constructed as standard error over average. Remember 
that simulations are run in order to have 10 000 scenarios with at least one default in each country. For 
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each scenario 20 different interbank matrices were constructed for each concentration level, so that in 
the end contagion in each country can be monitored by five matrices (one for each concentration level) 
with dimensions 10 000 x 20, for both losses and defaults. Variability in a single banking system is 
thus evaluated with the average value of the standard error/average ratio calculated for each row of the 
five matrices. 
 
Table 3:Variability — average value in standard error of contagion simulations results 
 + 20 % zeros + 35 % zeros + 50 % zeros + 65 % zeros + 80 % zeros 
BE 0.6 % 0.7 % 2.1 % 3.3 % 5.7 % 
IE 11 % 26 % 34 % 56 % 78 % 
IT 0.004 % 0.008 % 0.013 % 0.023 % 0.045 % 
PT 2 % 4 % 4 %          6 %                7 % 
 
The general trend is an increase in variability as the simulation moves up from a situation with 20 % of 
zeros added in the interbank matrices to 80 %. This trend is confirmed in all four countries considered, 
even if differences between them can be seen from the differences in the magnitude of variability (see, 
for example, the comparison between Ireland and Italy). 
The authors also investigated if changes in the interbank matrix produce an effect on losses aggregated 
on the basis of the magnitude of contagion. Tables 4.1 to 4.4 and 5.1 to 5.4 report three possible levels, 
individualised by the amount of losses originated in the cases of maximum entropy and of no 
contagion. In this regard, it must be remembered that simulations were run with and without contagion, 
in order to evaluate the effects of linkages between banks. 
In detail, the ‘Overall’ column in Tables 4.1 to 4.4 represents the average number of defaults, over the 
10 000 simulated scenarios, while Tables 5.1 to 5.4 report the average excess losses calculated per 
country. The other three columns show the same losses split on the basis of the magnitude of 
contagion. More specifically: 
 NO CONTAGION contains cases where: )()( ioBaseScenarExcessLossnNoContagioExcessLoss   
 SMALL CONTAGION contains cases where: 
( ) ( ) ( )ExcessLoss BaseScenario ExcessLoss NoContagion ExcessLoss NoContagion   
 LARGE CONTAGION contains cases where: 
( ) ( ) ( )ExcessLoss BaseScenario ExcessLoss NoContagion ExcessLoss NoContagion   
The ‘BASE’ row refers to the maximum entropy situation, whereas +20 %, +35 %, +50 %, +65 % and 
+80 % indicate subsequent changes in the interbank matrix. 
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Table 4.1: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Belgium 
BE  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 747 cases) (2 275 cases) (978 cases) 
BASE 1.84 1.00 2.67 5.75 
+20 % 1.85 1.00 2.68 5.76 
+35 % 1.87 1.00 2.72 5.82 
+50 % 1.90 1.00 2.80 5.97 
+65 % 1.96 1.04 2.95 6.00 
+80 % 2.12 1.07 3.37 6.48 
 
 
Table 4.2: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Ireland 
IE  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 174 cases) (937 cases) (2 889 cases) 
BASE 4.41 1.00 2.21 12.40 
+20 % 4.46 1.03 2.41 12.45 
+35 % 4.51 1.11 2.81 12.35 
+50 % 4.65 1.19 3.73 12.34 
+65 % 4.82 1.49 4.30 12.10 
+80 % 5.51 2.34 6.58 11.94 
 
 
Table 4.3: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Italy 
IT  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 694 cases) (3 305 cases) (0 cases) 
BASE 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
+20 % 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
+35 % 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
+50 % 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
+65 % 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
+80 % 2.15 1.00 4.48 - 
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Table 4.4: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Portugal 
PT  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 814 cases) (2 478 cases) (708 cases) 
BASE 1.85 1.00 3.19 5.39 
+20 % 1.85 1.00 3.18 5.38 
+35 % 1.83 1.01 3.07 5.33 
+50 % 1.81 1.01 2.99 5.39 
+65 % 1.79 1.03 2.88 5.31 
+80 % 1.74 1.01 2.76 5.16 
 
Figure 1: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Belgium 
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Figure2: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Ireland 
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Figure 3: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Italy 
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Figure 4: Number of defaults by contagion magnitude — Portugal 
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Table 5.1: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Belgium 
BE  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 747 cases) (2 275 cases) (978 cases) 
BASE 2 696 176 498 464 5 063 463 12 352 041 
+20 % 2 693 324 498 724 5 065 719 12 314 761 
+35 % 2 693 778 498 956 5 064 582 12 320 454 
+50 % 2 703 282 499 291 5 109 217 12 311 490 
+65 % 2 710 214 504 140 5 147 584 12 259 669 
+80 % 2 761 571 512 407 5 394 238 12 153 998 
 
 
 20 
Table 5.2: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Ireland 
IE  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 174 cases) (937 cases) (2 889 cases) 
BASE      16 998 231           989 367       2 394 299     55 946 867  
+20 %      17 049 103       1 074 374       3 407 988     55 612 516  
+35 %      16 968 441       1 291 853       5 529 794     54 180 373  
+50 %      17 206 620       1 565 217       9 522 706     53 125 572  
+65 %      17 321 954       2 517 032     12 076 994     50 662 249  
+80 %      19 941 129       6 014 341     22 203 313     48 969 972  
 
 
Table 5.3: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Italy 
IT  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 694 cases) (3 305 cases) (0 cases) 
BASE 171 048 47 199 421 817 - 
+20 % 171 046 47 199 421 812 - 
+35 % 171 045 47 199 421 807 - 
+50 % 171 052 47 199 421 828 - 
+65 % 171 047 47 199 421 815 - 
+80 % 171 042 47 200 421 800 - 
 
 
Table 5.4: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Portugal 
PT  CONTAGION 
 Overall NO SMALL LARGE 
 (10 000 cases) (6 814 cases) (2 478 cases) (708 cases) 
BASE 881 506 68 602 1 984 053 4 846 226 
+20 % 881 388 68 664 1 990 277 4 822 161 
+35 % 879 098 68 842 1 989 835 4 789 649 
+50 % 884 939 68 910 2 007 381 4 810 091 
+65 % 887 535 69 586 2 037 210 4 735 842 
+80 % 898 572 70 164 2 093 690 4 688 501 
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Figure 5: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Belgium 
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Figure 6: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Ireland 
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Figure 7: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Italy 
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Figure 8: Average value of losses by contagion magnitude — Portugal 
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The average results (‘Overall’ column) clearly indicate that, considering all 10 000 scenarios, changes 
in the interbank matrix (zeros added) do not significantly influence the amount of excess losses found 
in the base case of maximum entropy. The only exception is Ireland +80 %, where the amount of losses 
jumps when the extreme concentration level is reached. Nevertheless, some differences originate when 
the results are split into groups selected by the size of contagion. In the small contagion case, the 
maximum entropy hypothesis (base values) tends to lead to underestimation of excess losses, whereas 
in big crises (large contagion) maximum entropy seems to overestimate contagion effects (as found by 
Mistrulli, 2010). 
Looking at differences between countries, banking systems with a large number of banks (Italy) tend 
to have more stability in results, producing almost the same estimates for excess losses despite the 
hypothesis over the interbank matrix. 
Countries with a smaller number of banks experience more significant changes in the amount of losses. 
In particular, contagion is more vulnerable to changes in the interbank structure in countries that have 
more sizable interbank exposures (and lower capitalisation) and are therefore more exposed to 
financial contagion (Ireland). In these situations the no contagion and small contagion simulations are 
highly underestimated, whereas large contagion cases are slightly overestimated. 
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5.2 Effects on losses probability distribution 
Different evaluations can be found when considering the probability distribution of financial crises by 
crisis of final effects values (instead of contagion effects). 
Tables 6.1 to 6.4 report, for each country, the distribution of the 10 000 simulated scenarios. In each 
table, column 1 (no contagion) shows the magnitude of systemic excess losses without contagion 
effects, column 2 (base scenario) shows results for the baseline scenario (i.e. under the maximum 
entropy assumption) and columns 3 to 8 contain results for the matrices with 20 %, 35 %, 50 %, 65 % or 
80 % of matrix elements set to zero. 
Comparison between columns 1 and 2 could be useful to address the effects of contagion. For instance, 
Table 6.1 indicates that contagion in the Belgian banking system has no effect on systemic excess 
losses under the 40th percentile of the distribution. 
For each of these five classes of variation (20 %, 35 % 50 %, 65 % and 80 %), the authors estimated 20 
probability distributions obtained via 20 different interbank matrices. The averages and standard errors 
are reported in the tables below. 
The results show that variations in the structure of the interbank matrix do not really affect the 
probability distribution of banking crisis estimates. This is probably (and almost partially) due to the 
fact that when the interbank matrix is incomplete, contagion affects some banks more and does not 
affect others, thus inducing different results, but, when considering the whole system, larger effects on 
some banks and lower on others balance out and the final distribution (which is re-ordered by crisis 
size) is not deeply affected. 
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Table 6.1: Estimated losses probability distribution — Belgium 
BE 
No 
contagion 
Base 
scenario 
+20 % zeros +35 % zeros +50 % zeros +65 % zeros +80 % zeros 
   Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
             
90 % 4 963 902 8 076 588 8 067 476 1% 8 075 254 1% 8 083 277 1% 8 123 097 2% 8 325 802 5% 
80 % 2 124 436 3 165 878 3 169 533 0% 3 176 077 1% 3 223 853 3% 3 263 529 4% 3 559 248 8% 
70 % 696 941 1 260 621 1 267 342 1% 1 274 006 1% 1 318 665 6% 1 346 789 7% 1 489 448 13% 
60 % 238 197 269 098 269 019 0% 269 248 0% 268 486 1% 272 527 2% 273 569 4% 
50 % 113 708 119 845 119 820 0% 119 809 0% 119 648 0% 120 114 1% 120 170 1% 
40 % 60 175 61 529 61 526 0% 61 513 0% 61 499 0% 61 702 1% 61 801 1% 
30 % 31 970 32 241 32 239 0% 32 243 0% 32 237 0% 32 270 0% 32 271 0% 
20 % 16 151 16 249 16 255 0% 16 256 0% 16 259 0% 16 266 0% 16 267 0% 
10 % 6 500 6 517 6 517 0% 6 517 0% 6 518 0% 6 522 0% 6 523 0% 
 
Table 6.2: Estimated losses probability distribution — Ireland 
IE 
No 
contagion 
Base 
scenario 
+20 % zeros +35 % zeros +50 % zeros +65 % zeros +80 % zeros 
   Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
             
90 % 4 985 377 62 698 542 62 758 442 0% 62 717 637 1% 63 004 224 1% 63 004 066 2% 62 939 981 3% 
80 % 2 657 548 51 321 600 51 355 471 2% 50 964 341 4% 50 558 473 7% 49 386 188 8% 53 126 401 7% 
70 % 1 610 770 6 867 626 6 830 817 2% 8 176 396 91% 11 430 821 103% 12 758 165 87% 35 753 569 37% 
60 % 987 499 2 094 352 2 128 881 2% 2 210 744 12% 2 414 177 13% 2 760 687 22% 7 317 439 111% 
50 % 591 401 943 087 968 819 4% 999 867 7% 1 082 851 10% 1 192 853 15% 1 997 922 34% 
40 % 338 844 470 510 475 435 4% 489 601 8% 518 941 12% 566 961 19% 759 291 40% 
30 % 182 764 225 856 227 429 3% 231 543 6% 241 571 8% 257 633 13% 289 531 16% 
20 % 87 586 98 216 98 576 2% 99 634 3% 102 256 4% 106 534 7% 112 791 10% 
10 % 33 409 35 908 35 957 1% 36 246 2% 36 883 3% 37 968 5% 39 415 9% 
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Table 6.3: Estimated losses probability distribution — Italy 
IT 
No 
contagion 
Base 
scenario 
+20 % zeros +35 % zeros +50 % zeros +65 % zeros +80 % zeros 
   Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
             
90 % 314 591 316 000 315 998 0% 315 992 0% 315 954 0% 315 892 0% 315 887 0% 
80 % 119 961 120 194 120 204 0% 120 184 0% 120 188 0% 120 174 0% 120 158 0% 
70 % 65 722 65 722 65 722 0% 65 728 0% 65 732 0% 65 739 0% 65 739 0% 
60 % 40 647 40 647 40 647 0% 40 647 0% 40 647 0% 40 647 0% 40 647 0% 
50 % 26 612 26 612 26 612 0% 26 612 0% 26 612 0% 26 612 0% 26 614 0% 
40 % 16 822 16 822 16 822 0% 16 822 0% 16 822 0% 16 822 0% 16 822 0% 
30 % 10 481 10 481 10 481 0% 10 481 0% 10 481 0% 10 481 0% 10 481 0% 
20 % 5 828 5 828 5 828 0% 5 828 0% 5 828 0% 5 828 0% 5 828 0% 
10 % 2 368 2 368 2 368 0% 2 368 0% 2 368 0% 2 368 0% 2 368 0% 
 
Table 6.4: Estimated losses probability distribution — Portugal 
PT 
No 
contagion 
Base 
scenario 
+20 % zeros +35 % zeros +50 % zeros +65 % zeros +80 % zeros 
   Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
Average 
Standard 
error % 
             
90 % 1 731 395 2 465 932 2 469 978 0% 2 466 611 1% 2 496 896 1% 2 519 816 2% 2 593 774 5% 
80 % 567 998 866 993 862 903 1% 856 110 3% 877 474 2% 895 202 4% 964 488 13% 
70 % 196 915 274 012 272 333 1% 268 626 4% 270 659 3% 268 213 3% 268 228 5% 
60 % 85 532 96 355 96 196 0% 96 170 1% 95 781 1% 95 759 2% 94 690 1% 
50 % 42 275 44 584 44 569 0% 44 629 1% 44 438 0% 44 615 2% 44 240 1% 
40 % 22 892 23 454 23 463 0% 23 507 1% 23 436 0% 23 518 1% 23 367 0% 
30 % 12 956 13 306 13 283 0% 13 263 1% 13 219 0% 13 252 1% 13 160 0% 
20 % 6 778 6 833 6 830 0% 6 833 0% 6 825 0% 6 835 0% 6 813 0% 
10 % 2 933 2 942 2 942 0% 2 944 0% 2 943 0% 2 948 0% 2 942 0% 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper tested maximum entropy approximation for the interbank matrix in simulating contagion 
effects in banking systems. In the process, an uncertainty test was performed on the maximum entropy 
matrix by developing an algorithm that allows more concentrated interbank exposures to be obtained. 
A Monte Carlo method was applied to generate banking crises scenarios that were used to test 
contagion effects. Results obtained from the maximum entropy interbank matrix were then compared 
with the results derived from higher concentration in the matrices. 
The probability distribution of losses is rather stable even with 80 % more zeros in the matrix. 
Conversely, when considering the magnitude of contagion, it can be seen that excess losses tend to be 
underestimated when the maximum entropy matrix is used in banking systems with large interbank 
exposures and in ‘small contagion crises’. Otherwise ‘large contagion crises’ tend to be associated 
with overestimation of excess losses. 
As in Mistrulli (2010), the authors found that underestimation of contagion by maximum entropy is 
heightened by the specific features of the banking system. More specifically, high levels of 
capitalisation, low interbank exposure and large samples seem to produce more stable results. On the 
other hand, low capitalisation, high interbank exposure and a small number of banks result in 
underestimation of excess losses in ‘small contagion crises’ and overestimation in ‘large contagion 
crises’. 
Therefore, the results for different countries seem to be clearly affected by certain characteristics of the 
banking system. Precise quantification of their individual effects would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless it is worth developing this approach further and performing a sensitivity analysis 
in order to quantify better the effects of banking systems’ characteristics on financial contagion. 
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Abstract 
 
The main lesson learned from the recent financial crisis is the crucial role of interconnectedness between banks 
as a factor that can push the effects of bank defaults to extreme levels. 
One bank in distress can compromise the ability to repay obligations of its creditor banks, thereby inducing a 
more general crisis that spreads from the banking system towards the real economy. Several empirical and 
theoretical studies have focused on the role of the interbank market in causing contagion in financial crises. 
In this regard, one frequent problem encountered in dealing with contagion risk in the banking system is that 
only data on interbank credits and debts aggregated at bank level are publicly available, whereas the whole 
matrix of interbank linkages would be needed in order to estimate systemic risk correctly. 
One common solution is to assume that banks maximise the dispersion of their interbank credits and debts, so 
that the interbank matrix can be approximated by its maximum entropy. 
This paper tests the influence of this hypothesis on simulations by verifying if variations in the structure of the 
interbank matrix lead to significant changes in the magnitude of contagion. 
In order to do this, an algorithm was developed that generates interbank matrices with higher concentration. 
Then a Monte Carlo simulation was run by making use of the SYMBOL model (SYstemic Model of Banking 
Originated Losses) jointly developed by the JRC, DG MARKT, and experts of banking regulation (see De Lisa et 
al., 2010). We than compared results obtained using the maximum entropy approximated matrix with those 
obtained from more concentrated matrices. 
Numerical experiments, performed on samples of banks from four European countries, highlight that 
concentration in interbank loans does affect results but that, when considering the probability distribution of 
losses, even significant changes in the interbank matrix do not deeply affect results. 
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